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4I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last fifty years, the percentage of women in the 
workforce has increased dramatically.1  As a result of this 
change, more women become pregnant while in the workforce.2  Over 
the past fifteen years, both the federal government and several 
state governments have attempted to meet the needs of pregnant 
employees by passing leave legislation, which requires employers 
to offer a required amount of job-protected leave for women 
during and after their pregnancies.3  However, despite these 
efforts, significant gaps in the law remain that prevent 
pregnant employees from receiving the comprehensive leave they 
1 See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, CHANGES IN WOMEN'S 
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION IN THE 20TH CENTURY (2000) (reporting that from 
1950 to 1998 the participation rate of women in the workforce 
increased from one in three to three in five).
2 See SHEILA B. KAMERMAN ET AL., MATERNITY POLICIES AND WORKING WOMEN 5 
(1983) (estimating that eighty-five percent of working women are 
likely to become pregnant during their careers).
3 See, e.g., Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 
2612 (2005) (providing twelve weeks of leave for medical 
reasons, including pregnancy); CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 3300-3306
(2005) (providing residents of California with six weeks of paid 
leave to care for a newborn or newly adopted child).
5need.4
The source of this gap is the separation of the singular 
condition of pregnancy into three distinct categories of 
absence.5  The first category of absence covers illnesses 
directly related to gestation, which can require leave from 
work.6  The second category of absence covers the physical act of 
4 See JODI GRANT ET AL., EXPECTING BETTER: A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS OF 
PARENTAL LEAVE PROGRAMS 9 (2005) (reporting that no state gives all 
employees both job-protected leave and benefits).
5 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (separating pregnancy and 
childbirth under its medical leave provision and allowing 
parental leave for the birth of a child under the parental leave 
provision).
6 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:341 (2005) (limiting leave 
only to medical conditions associated with pregnancy and 
childbirth and excluding parental leave).  See Am. Pregnancy 
Ass’n, Pregnancy Symptoms – Early Signs of Pregnancy, 
http://www.americanpregnancy.org/gettingpregnant/
earlypregnancysymptoms.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2005) 
(listing some of the most common symptoms of pregnancy as 
morning sickness, tiredness/exhaustion, backaches, and frequent 
urination).  If severe, these symptoms can impede the 
performance of basic work duties.  Id.
6childbirth that can require leave from work for the event and 
recovery.7  Because these first two categories of absence deal 
primarily with the physiological conditions related to 
pregnancy, legislation usually refers to both as forms of 
medical leave.8  The third category of absence, referred to as 
parental leave, covers leave from work for the employee to care 
for and bond with the new child.9
By dividing pregnancy into these separate categories and 
7 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 105D (2005) (requiring eight 
weeks of leave upon the birth of a child). See Mayo Clinic, 
Caesarian Birth and the Road to Recovery, CNN.COM, Dec. 21, 2004, 
http://www.cnn.com/HEALTH/library/PR/ 00101.html (reporting that 
vaginal births usually require six weeks of recovery time, while 
caesarian births can require up to eight).
8 See, e.g., Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 C.F.R. § 
825.114 (2005) (defining “serious medical condition” under the 
medical leave provision as any period of incapacity due to 
pregnancy or childbirth).
9 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (distinguishing childbirth leave to 
allow the employee time to recover from the physical condition 
of labor from parental leave to allow the employee time to care 
for and bond with her child because childbirth leave requires 
medical certification).
7not treating the condition comprehensively, leave legislation 
creates gaps between coverage for medical leave and coverage for 
parental leave, during which time the pregnant employee would be 
without leave and vulnerable to job termination.10  The seminal 
case illustrating this problem is the recent New Jersey Supreme 
Court case of Gerety v. Atlantic City Hilton Casino Resort.11  In 
addition to demonstrating the lack of comprehensive leave for 
pregnant employees, Gerety also demonstrates the failure of 
anti-discrimination statutes to fill such gaps and protect 
pregnant employees from discrimination.12
10 See Gerety v. Atlantic City Hilton Casino Resort, 877 A.2d 
1233, 1334-36 (N.J. 2005) (stating pregnant employees could be 
covered for both state medical and federal parental leave).
11 See id. (reporting that a pregnant employee was fired during a 
thirteen day gap in leave coverage).
12 See id. at 1242 (finding that the employer’s policy did not 
succeed under disparate impact theory because of the policy’s 
neutral application). Disparate impact theory involves an 
employment practice that is facially neutral in their 
treatment of different groups but impacts one group more 
harshly than another and cannot be justified by business 
necessity.  Id. at 1237.
8In Part II, this Comment describes Gerety in detail, along 
with the current state of both federal and state leave laws and 
federal and state pregnancy discrimination laws.13 In Part III, 
this Comment argues that it is the interaction of federal and 
state leave laws that most often creates a gap in leave and that 
this gap produces a disparate impact on pregnant employees, 
which violates the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.14  Finally, Part 
III examines the most common misinterpretations courts make when 
examining pregnant employees’ requests for recovery under anti-
discrimination laws.15  In conclusion, this Comment advocates for 
the treatment of pregnancy as one singular condition under leave 
laws, because a holistic approach would more closely mirror 
13 See infra Part II.A-B (describing the different ways in which 
pregnant employees are covered under state and federal leave 
laws and the theories of recovery found in anti-discrimination 
statutes).
14 See infra Part III.A (explaining in detail the potential for 
gaps within several states and how a reasonable accommodation 
standard not only fixes the gap but more realistically meets the 
needs of employees and employers).
15 See infra Part III.C (exploring the courts’ misinterpretation 
of disparate impact theory and confusion over pregnant women’s 
unique position). 
9women’s real world experience with pregnancy and prevent 
discriminatory gaps.16
II. BACKGROUND
Lack of comprehensive leave laws can cause significant harm 
to pregnant employees.17  First, without leave and job 
protection, a pregnant employee is at risk for termination, 
which puts her economic well-being in jeopardy during an already 
financially trying time.18  Also, adequate leave time also 
assures both the physical and psychological well-being of the 
16 See infra Part IV (advocating that a holistic approach is far 
superior to the piecemeal fashion in which legislation is 
currently being passed).
17 See GRANT ET AL., supra note 4, at 7 (stating studies show that 
parental leave results in better prenatal and postnatal care, 
more intense parental bonding over a child’s lifetime, and lower 
accident rates in the first year of life). 
18 See CENT. FOR NUTRITION AND PUB. POLICY, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., 
EXPENDITURES ON CHILDREN BY FAMILIES 2 (2005) (reporting that the 
average child-rearing costs in the first year of life for a two-
child, married-couple family in the middle-income group was 
between $9,840 and $10,900).
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employee.19  In addition, not only basic fairness but the law 
itself dictates that employers should not require pregnant 
employees to face gaps in coverage that other non-pregnant 
employees do not face.20  Lastly, adequate leave also confers 
concrete benefits upon employers.21
19 See Sue Shellenbarger, Shorter Maternity Leaves Are a Danger 
to Working Mothers, CAREERJOURNAL.COM: THE WALL STREET JOURNAL,
http://www.careerjournal.com/columnists/ workfamily/20040521-
workfamily.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2005) (reporting on a 
National Bureau of Economic Research study that found mothers 
who take at least three months off after childbirth show fifteen 
percent fewer symptoms of depression after they return to work).
20 See 124 CONG. REC. 38, 573 (1978) (statement of Rep. Hawkins) 
(arguing that the PDA, which legally requires pregnant employees 
be treated the same as other employees, ". . . represents only 
basic fairness for women employees.").
21 See Christy Ogelsby, More Options for Moms Seeking Work-Family 
Balance, CNN.COM, May 10, 2001, http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001
working.moms/stories/mainstory.html (contending that studies 
link the lack of good medical and parental leave to problems for 
employers, such as absenteeism and burnout).
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A. Gerety and the Gap Created by Current Medical and 
Parental Leave Laws
The facts in Gerety v. Atlantic City Hilton Casino Resort
clearly illustrate the gap in coverage created by the lack of 
comprehensive leave legislation.22  Christina Gerety had worked 
for the Atlantic City Hilton Casino Resort (“Hilton”) for almost 
ten years when she learned that she was pregnant with twins.23
While intending to work during her pregnancy, approximately a 
month into her first trimester Gerety took a short leave of 
absence due to illness related to her condition.24  Later, upon 
the advice of her physician, Gerety requested an extended period 
of leave.25  Hilton’s leave policy only provided for two types of 
22 See 877 A.2d 1233, 1234 (N.J. 2005) (reporting that there was 
a gap in coverage between when the employee exhausted her 
medical leave and when she would have been eligible for parental 
leave).
23 See id. at 1234 (reporting that Gerety’s husband also worked 
at the Hilton and that they both stayed and worked through a 
major change in management).
24 See id. (noting that Gerety only took a two day leave of 
absence in the beginning of her pregnancy).
25 See id. (stating that Gerety’s original leave of absence was 
to end on Dec. 1st and was later extended through Feb. 1st).
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leave: (1) leave under federal and state leave legislation, and 
(2) fourteen weeks of leave under its own policy.26  Her doctor 
certified the first twelve weeks of Gerety’s leave as medical 
leave under the main form of federal leave legislation – The 
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”).27
In 1993, Congress passed the FMLA in recognition of the 
importance of a work and life balance, not only for pregnant 
employees but for all employees.28  The FMLA requires that all 
large employers provide twelve workweeks of leave during each 
twelve-month period.29  An employee can request leave for four 
reasons, the two applicable to pregnant employees are the birth 
of the employee’s child or because of the employee’s own 
26 See id. at 1237 (allowing leave under the federal Family and 
Medical Leave Act of 1993 and the New Jersey Family Leave Act).
27 See id. (reporting that up to this point both Gerety and 
Hilton anticipated Gerety’s return to work without any adverse 
repercussions).
28 See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3 
(1993) (finding that “the lack of employment policies to 
accommodate working parents can force individuals to choose 
between job security and parenting.”).
29 See 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (2005) (defining employers as those with 
fifty or more employees within a seventy-five mile radius).
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“serious health condition.”30  In addition to providing an 
employee with twelve weeks of leave, an employer may not 
discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee for 
taking advantage of the FMLA and must return the employee to her 
original position upon her return from leave.31
During Gerety’s leave, her physicians discovered one of the 
babies had a serious health problem and hospitalized Gerety as a 
result.32  Based on these developments, her physician recommended 
Gerety further extend her absence from work.33  Because she had 
exhausted all twelve weeks of FMLA medical leave and the 
30 See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a) 
(2005) (stating that the other two reasons for leave are because 
the employee has adopted a child or received a foster child or 
to care for a family member with a serious health condition).
31 See 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (2005) (disallowing retaliatory action by 
the employer, such as firing or reduction in seniority).
32 See Gerety, 877 A.2d at 1234 (acknowledging that Gerety had a 
bona fide medical concern and that there was no dispute to this 
matter).
33 See id. (stating that at this time Gerety’s anticipated due 
date was still May, which meant Hilton expected her to need an 
addition month of leave then she would have needed due to the 
premature birth of the twins).
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additional fourteen weeks provided to her by Hilton, Hilton 
terminated Gerety and told her that while they would consider 
rehiring her, she would lose all seniority benefits.34  However, 
despite exhausting all twenty-six weeks on medical leave, Gerety 
was still eligible for twelve weeks of parental leave under the 
New Jersey Family Leave Act (“NJFLA”).35
Several states have their own versions of parental and 
medical leave legislation and the FMLA clearly states that the 
law does not interfere with or supersede additional leave 
provided by state laws.36  Some states, like New Jersey, restrict 
leave to cover only medical leave or only parental leave.37  When 
34 See id. (stating that the only other option given Gerety by 
Hilton was to return to work immediately under New Jersey law).
35 See id. (stating that she would have been eligible for more 
leave upon the birth of her children).
36 See 29 U.S.C. § 2651 (2005) (including in this provision any 
leave provided under parental and medical leave or anti-
discrimination laws); see also 29 U.S.C. § 2653 (2005) (stating 
explicitly that employers should feel free to retain or adopt 
more generous leave policies). 
37 See, e.g., New Jersey Family Leave Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
34:11b-4 (West 2005) (excluding all serious medical conditions, 
15
that happens, the state leave does not run concurrent to the 
FMLA leave, as it would if both state and federal law covered 
the same type of leave.38  As a result, a pregnant employee in 
these states is in the same position as Gerety - that is, she 
may be eligible for twelve weeks of medical leave under federal 
law and an additional twelve weeks of parental leave under state 
law.39
Unfortunately, Gerety was unable to take full advantage of 
both banks of leave because she was fired before the birth of 
her children, which would have triggered eligibility for more 
state parental leave.40  The gap in time between the exhaustion 
of her medical leave and the birth of her children, which would 
including pregnancy-related illness or childbirth, but covering 
parental leave).
38 See 29 U.S.C. § 2651 (stating that leave provided under the 
FMLA does not supersede additional state leave coverage, not 
equivalent state leave coverage).
39 See Gerety, 877 A.2d at 1235 (reporting that Gerety would have 
been eligible for a total of thirty-eight weeks of leave between 
federal leave, state leave, and employer leave).
40 See id. (stating that Hilton fired Gerety after she had used 
only 182 days of leave).
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have triggered her parental leave, was only thirteen days.41  In 
other words, if Gerety had begun her medical leave only thirteen 
days later, she would have been covered through birth by the 
medical leave and after birth by the NJFLA.42  Thus, despite 
going over Hilton’s twenty-six week leave policy, the NJFLA 
would have prohibited Hilton from terminating her employment 
because she took parental leave.43  However, because of the gap 
in coverage, the law left Gerety without leave and without 
protection.44
41 See id. (reporting that Hilton fired Gerety on April 2nd and 
that she went into labor and delivered twin daughters on April 
14th).
42 See id. (showing that if she had begun her leave in mid-
October the twenty-six weeks of leave would have reached until 
the birth of her children in mid-April).
43 See New Jersey Family Leave Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11b-4 
(West 2005) (prohibiting the termination or denial of seniority 
benefits upon return from leave to employees taking the parental 
leave).
44 See Gerety, 877 A.2d at 1235 (stating Gerety was left without 
options and filed a complaint with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, the federal agency charged with 
enforcing Title VII).
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B. Gerety and the Hesitation of Courts to Find Disparate 
Impact in Pregnancy Discrimination Cases
After her termination, Gerety filed a gender discrimination 
claim under New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination (“LAD”) 
alleging that Hilton’s policy had a disparate impact on pregnant 
employees.45
The LAD is the equivalent of Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, the federal anti-discrimination law, which 
prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.46  In the first ten 
years after enactment, the majority of state and federal courts 
interpreted sex discrimination under Title VII to include 
pregnancy discrimination.47  Despite this precedent set by other 
45 See id. (reporting that the plaintiff also alleged wrongful 
termination, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and 
retaliatory action against her husband).
46 See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-2 (a)(1) (2005) (including prohibition against 
discrimination with regards to “compensation, terms, conditions, 
or privileges of employment . . . ”). 
47 See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Lake Oswego Sch. Dist. No. 7, 519 
F.2d 961, 968 (9th Cir. 1975) (dismissing employer policy that 
did not pay disability benefits for pregnancy or childbirth-
18
courts, the Supreme Court in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert
clearly stated that Title VII did not cover pregnancy 
discrimination.48  Congress quickly responded to the Court’s 
decision by passing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”) as 
an amendment to Title VII that states the terms:
‘[B]ecause of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, 
but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of 
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; 
and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or 
related medical conditions shall be treated the same 
for all employment-related purposes, including receipt 
of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other 
persons not so affected but similar in their ability 
or inability to work.49
Not only did the amendment include pregnancy in the definition 
of sex discrimination, the PDA codified what state courts had 
been requiring from employers for several years – that employers 
related absences as discriminatory under Title VII); Wetzel v. 
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 372 F. Supp. 1146, 1163 (W.D. Pa. 1974) 
(maintaining that the school board’s policy of firing employees 
if they did not return three months after birth was a violation 
of Title VII).
48 See 429 U.S. 125, 137 (1976) (stating that there was no way to 
prove that the exclusion of pregnancy benefits were designed to 
discriminate and that the plaintiff failed to prove the neutral 
plan had a disparate impact on women). 
49
 Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2005).
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must treat pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical condition 
the same as any other temporary disability.50
As previously mentioned, several states have their own 
anti-discrimination law; and after the passage of the PDA, it 
was unclear whether or not the federal law pre-empted any state 
laws offering more expansive coverage.51  In California Fed. Sav. 
& Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, the Supreme Court looked at a California 
statute that required every pregnant employee to receive up to 
four months of leave for either pregnancy or childbirth, even if 
other employees received less temporary disability leave.52  In 
its analysis, the Court found that the state law was not 
50 See 37 Questions & Answers, 29 C.F.R. Part 1604, Appendix 
(EEOC 1978) (appending the guidelines to Title VII with these 
Questions and Answers for employees to provide guidance on the 
interpretation of the new amendment).
51 See California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 
273 (1987) (considering whether or not Title VII pre-empted a 
state anti-discrimination law that required leave in addition to 
prohibiting discrimination and finding there was no pre-
emption). 
52 See id. at 276 (evaluating the plaintiff’s claim that the job-
protected leave was denied to her because upon her return she 
was refused an equivalent position).
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inconsistent with the purpose of Title VII and that the federal 
law did not pre-empt the state law.53
In examining Gerety’s claim of discrimination under the 
NJFLA, the court stated that it would look to the “substantive 
and procedural standards established” under Title VII in 
determining discrimination claims.54  Since Title VII now 
explicitly covers pregnancy as a form of sex-based 
discrimination, federals courts have stated repeatedly that 
plaintiffs, like Gerety, would have the same two legal theories 
available to them as any other Title VII plaintiff, including 
disparate impact theory.55  Since the LAD is New Jersey’s version 
53 See id. at 285 (quoting and agreeing with the Court of Appeals  
that Congress intended the PDA to be "a floor beneath which 
pregnancy disability benefits may not drop -- not a ceiling 
above which they may not rise”).
54 See Gerety v. Atlantic City Hilton Casino Resort, 877 A.2d 
1233, 1237 (N.J. 2005) (quoting Viscik v. Fowler Equipment Co., 
Inc., 173 N.J. 1, 13 (2002)) (finding that federal standards had 
been applied however with flexibility).
55 See Scherr v. Woodland Sch. Cmty. Consol. Dist. No. 50, 867 
F.2d 974, 984  (7th Cir. 1988) (holding explicitly for the first 
time that PDA claims may be brought under both disparate impact 
and disparate treatment theory); see also McDonnell Douglas 
21
of Title VII, the court allows the use of both disparate 
treatment and disparate impact theories, focusing in particular 
in Gerety on the plaintiff’s claim of disparate impact.56
Under this theory, an employee can prove a violation of the 
PDA based on the disparate impact of a facially neutral policy, 
like Hilton’s leave policy, on a protected group, here, pregnant 
women.57  The employer can defend itself by proving that the 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973) (explaining the other 
theory available to the plaintiffs, disparate treatment, as 
combating intentional, willful discrimination against members of 
a protected class and setting out a test to prove this type of 
discrimination).
56 See Gerety, 877 A.2d at 1237 (focusing only on the disparate 
impact claim because it was the only theory presented during 
argument).
57 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971) 
(finding that an employer’s requirement of a high school 
education or a general intelligence test had an adverse impact 
on black applicants); see also Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United 
States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977) (stating that statistical 
evidence played an important role in proving disparate impact, 
particularly in employment cases).
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practice is a job-related business necessity.58  However, even if 
the employer establishes business necessity, the employee can 
still prevail if she can prove that there was a less 
discriminatory policy that would "serve the employer's 
legitimate interest in ‘efficient and trustworthy 
workmanship.'"59  In addition, the employee is under no 
requirement during any point in this process to prove that the 
employer had a discriminatory motive.60
58 See De Laurier v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 588 F.2d 
674 (1978) (finding a school district correctly asserted a 
business necessity defense where they prohibited pregnant 
teachers from working during the ninth month of pregnancy 
because of safety and efficiency concerns related to a 
teacher’s multifarious duties). 
59 See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (quoting 
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975)) (finding 
that a height and weight requirement for prison guards had a 
disparate impact on women and limiting the tasks available to 
women guards had a less discriminatory impact).
60 See id. at 335-36 (clarifying that the legislative intent of 
Title VII was to prevent discriminatory consequences not 
discriminatory motives). 
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However, while disparate impact theory is available to 
pregnant employees facing discrimination, as the court shows in 
Gerety, plaintiffs have had a difficult time proving their 
case.61  First, while the Seventh Circuit stated that disparate 
impact was applicable to pregnancy discrimination claims in 
Scherr v. Woodland Sch. Cmty. Consol. Dist. No. 50, the Supreme 
Court has never explicitly declared its applicability, and many 
districts and several circuits hold that it is not available in 
pregnancy discrimination cases.62
Second, in addition to overall reluctance on the part of 
61 See Pamela L. Perry, Let Them Become Professionals: An 
Analysis of the Failure to Enforce Title VII’s Pay Equity 
Mandate, 14 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 127, 136-39 (1991) (noting the
courts’ historical resistance to disparate impact theory in all 
gender discrimination contexts).
62 See Laura Schlictmann, Accommodation of Pregnancy-Related 
Disabilities on the Job, 15 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 335, 373 
(1994) (arguing that the closest the Court has come in 
addressing the issue was in California Federal Savings & Loan 
Assn. v. Guerra, where the Court looked at a California law that 
required enhanced leave for pregnant employees).  Despite the 
Supreme Court’s quoting a seminal disparate impact case, they 
held the state law was not pre-empted by Title VII.  Id.
24
the Court, many courts have stated that the PDA requires only 
equal treatment between pregnant employees and non-pregnant, but 
similarly disabled, employees.63  This seems to be the conclusion 
of the majority in Gerety, which granted the employer’s motion 
for summary judgment based solely upon the policy’s neutral 
application and the fact that the policy was not subject to any 
exception, no matter the employee’s illness.64
However, other courts have held that the PDA can require 
leave for pregnant employees claiming disparate impact.65  In 
63 See, e.g., EEOC v. Ackerman, Hood & McQueen, Inc., 956 F.2d 
944, 949 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding that pregnant employee’s only 
had access to disparate treatment analysis, as opposed to 
disparate impact analysis, because Title VII only required 
neutral application).
64 See Gerety v. Atlantic City Hilton Casino Resort, 877 A.2d 
1233, 1242 (N.J. 2005) (claiming that the case was about 
preferential treatment for pregnant employees and not freedom 
from discrimination).
65 See, e.g., Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986, 994 
(5th Cir. 1982) (finding that an employer’s policy of 
terminating pregnant employees because of concerns with fetal 
safety had a disparate impact and was discriminatory because the 
employer failed to use alternative, less discriminatory policy); 
25
Abraham v. Graphic Arts Int’l Union, the court found the 
employer’s policy of allowing only a ten-day leave, while 
applied equally to both pregnant and non-pregnant employees, was 
still discriminatory towards pregnant employees.66  This is the 
position taken by the dissent in Gerety, which argues that 
Hilton’s policy does have a disparate impact on pregnant 
employees, that the LAD prohibits this form of discrimination, 
and that it is within the power of the courts to require 
reasonable accommodation of pregnant employees.67
III. ANALYSIS
Gerety is the paradigmatic case illustrating how the 
Hayes v. Shelby Mem’l Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1554 (11th Cir. 
1984) (finding disparate impact where employer had failed to 
establish a business necessity for firing a female x-ray 
technician when she became pregnant).
66 See 660 F.2d 811, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (stating that it was 
“[b]eyond peradventure, the limitation of leave to ten days 
affected women employed in the PEP program much more severely 
. . . ”).
67 See Gerety, 877 A.2d at 1243 (Portiz, C.J. dissenting) 
(arguing that the case is not about preferential treatment, but 
about women being treated unfairly and differently than non-
pregnant employees).
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separation of pregnancy into distinct categories of absences 
under both state and federal leave legislation creates potential 
gaps between the different categories of leave.68 These gaps in 
leave not only require women to separate their one condition in 
order to meet differing leave standards69 but also expose 
pregnant employees to a risk of termination or loss of benefits 
not faced by non-pregnant employees.70  This disparate impact is 
clearly prohibited by the PDA.71  However, as the majority 
decision in Gerety shows, disparate impact theory under anti-
68 See id. (stating the gap was created between the first 
category of medical leave and the third category of parental 
leave).
69 See Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2005) 
(setting a certification standard for pregnancy-related illness 
leave higher and harder to reach than the standard for 
childbirth or parental leave).
70 See Gerety, 877 A.2d at 1234 (stating Gerety was fired upon 
expiration of leave and told she could be rehired but would lose 
all seniority benefits). 
71 See Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2005) 
(stating clearly that pregnant employees must be treated the 
same as “persons not so affected but similar in their ability or 
inability to work. . .”).
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discrimination statutes has not always been successful in 
protecting pregnant employees facing such gaps.72
A. State Leave Legislation: The Separation of Pregnancy 
into Distinct Categories of Absences Creates Gaps in 
Leave Coverage that Have an Disparate Impact on 
Pregnant Employees in Violation of the PDA
The court in Gerety correctly called on state lawmakers to 
respond to the needs of pregnant women with legislation that 
requires enhanced leave that would prevent gaps in coverage from 
occurring.73  Unfortunately, it is precisely such responses by 
state lawmakers that have created the gap in the first place; 
therefore, any future legislation will need to look closely at 
the examples of several states whose leave legislation prevents 
potential gaps from forming.74
72 See id. at 1240 (finding that Hilton’s leave policy did not 
have a disparate impact on pregnant women because it would also 
impact men facing gender-specific medical conditions such as 
testicular cancer).
73 See id. at 1241 (arguing that it is the legislature’s job to 
require enhanced leave and that the Court can not “legislate our 
personal preferences . . . ”).
74 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60 (2005) (requiring that 
employers with three or more employees grant pregnant employees 
a reasonable leave of absence for pregnancy-related illness, 
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1. The FMLA Creates Separate and Discriminatory 
Standards for Pregnant Employees to Meet and Does 
Not Provide an Adequate Amount of Leave
The FMLA alone has fallen short of meeting the needs of 
pregnant employees, and several states have responded with 
legislation to address those inadequacies.75  First, the 
separation of pregnancy under the FMLA into three categories of 
absences forces pregnant employees to meet stricter eligibility 
requirements for leave for illnesses related to gestation than 
required for childbirth leave.76  Second, by only covering twelve 
weeks of leave, the FMLA makes gaps in leave coverage more 
which would prevent gaps from forming by not setting distinct 
time limits).
75 See, e.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 3300-3306 (2005) (addressing 
the one problem with the FMLA, the fact that most families 
cannot afford to take unpaid leave, by becoming the first state 
in the nation to provide paid leave to employees for the care of 
their newborn child).
76 See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2612 
(2005) (requiring employees taking medical leave for pregnancy-
related illness to prove that their symptoms are a serious 
medical condition).
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likely, especially in the case of high-risk pregnancies.77
While the FMLA made inroads into the needs of pregnant 
employees, the separate treatment of pregnancy and childbirth 
within the law creates different eligibility requirements for 
coverage, which can have a discriminatory impact on pregnant 
employees.78  The FMLA automatically covers the birth of an 
employee’s child under either the first provision providing 
parental leave or the fourth provision providing medical leave.79
However, the FMLA would not automatically cover a pregnant 
employee, like Gerety, who wants to use the medical leave for 
77 See Multiple Pregnancies: Maternal Complications, WOMEN’S HEALTH 
CHANNEL, http://www.womenshealthchannel.com/multiplepregnancies/
risks_maternal.shtml (last visited Nov. 15, 2005) (stating that 
multiple births are twelve times more likely to be premature and 
therefore, often require long periods of bed rest for the 
mother).
78 See 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (requiring pregnancy-related illness to 
meet the requirements for “serious medical condition,” while not 
requiring childbirth to meet any standards).  As a result, only 
pregnant women would be required to differentiate symptoms 
within one medical condition.  Id.
79 See id. (noting that the adoption of a child would also be 
automatically covered for parental leave).
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illness related to gestation before childbirth and would require 
her to prove that the illness qualified as a “serious medical 
condition” which would prevent her from performing the essential 
functions of her job.80
The FMLA classifies serious medical condition as falling in 
one of two categories; pregnancy-related illness falls in the 
second category, as a condition that requires “continuing care 
by a health care provider.”81  Congress originally envisioned 
this category as covering all illnesses related to gestation, 
including common symptoms.82  In addition, the legislature 
80 See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 C.F.R. § 825.115 
(2005) (using the definition of disability within the Americans 
With Disabilities Act, which is that the employee be unable to 
perform the essential functions of the position).
81 See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11) (2005) (defining serious health 
condition as any condition that requires (A) inpatient care in a 
hospital, hospice, or residential medical care facility; or (B) 
continuing treatment by a health care provider).
82 See H.R. REP. NO.8, 103RD CONG., 1ST SESS., pt. 1 at 29 (1993) 
(listing among the conditions to be covered “ongoing pregnancy, 
miscarriages, complications or illnesses related to pregnancy, 
such as severe morning sickness, the need for prenatal care, 
childbirth and recovery from childbirth . . . ”).
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explicitly lists “any period of incapacity due to pregnancy, or 
for prenatal care” as included within the continuing care test.83
However, pregnancy claims were the among the first tried 
under the serious medical condition provision of the FMLA and 
the courts incorrectly strayed from this legislative intent 
immediately by requiring that pregnancy-related absences be the 
result of severe symptoms.84  In particular, in Gudenkauf v. 
Stauffer Commc’n, Inc. the court denied an employee’s FMLA 
claim, despite the presence of morning sickness, stress, nausea, 
back pain, swelling, and headaches, wrongly concluding that 
these were no more than the normal complications of pregnancy 
and did not prevent the employee from performing the essential 
functions of her job, in direct conflict with the legislative 
83 See 29 C.F.R. 825.114(a)(2) (listing prenatal care separately
from incapacity related to pregnancy).
84 See Kindlesparker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Comp., No. 94-C-
7542, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6164, at *1 (D. Ill. May 8, 1995) 
(assessing a plaintiff’s claim that she was discharged when her 
pregnancy required medical attention and denying relief because 
her pregnancy was not a serious medical condition, because it 
did not involve severe symptoms).
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intent expressed for the FMLA.85  Under the current standard, the 
FMLA would provide leave to a pregnant employee for a normal 
childbirth without complications, but not for a normal illness 
related to gestation, and in fact, would require a pregnant 
employee to prove her symptoms are severe.86  While this higher 
standard was not difficult for Gerety to meet because of the 
high-risk nature of her pregnancy, a pregnant employee 
attempting to receive medical leave for normal pregnancy-related 
illness essentially would face a much stricter standard than a 
pregnant employee attempting to receive medical or parental 
leave for childbirth.87
By differentiating between pregnancy-related illness and 
85 See 922 F. Supp. 465, 469 (D. Kan. 1996) (accepting the 
incapacity requirement, that the employee be unable to perform 
the essential functions of her position, as controlling).
86 See 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (2005) (allowing the employer to require 
the employee to seek a second opinion if he or she doubts the 
results of the first certification of leave).
87 See Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2005) 
(covering work absences for the birth or care of a child, the 
adoption of a child, to care for an ill family member, or for 
the employee’s own illness that makes it impossible to perform 
the essential functions of her job).
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childbirth, this requirement forces pregnant employees to look 
at her pregnancy as separate conditions and meet differing 
standards based on the stage of her conditions, something a non-
pregnant employee would not be required to do.88 As a result of 
these different standards, an employer can treat a pregnant 
employee differently than a non-pregnant employee.89  However, 
this different treatment clearly violates the PDA by treating 
pregnant employees differently than non-pregnant employees by 
requiring of them what would not be required of others, which 
creates a disparate impact on pregnant employees.90
88 See id. (requiring pregnancy-related illness to be severe and 
incapacitating, while not requiring the presence of abnormal 
severity for childbirth).
89 See William McDevitt, Evaluating the Current Judicial 
Interpretation of “Serious Health Condition” Under the FMLA, 6 
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 697, 716 (1997) (calling on the Supreme Court 
to define a bona fide period of incapacity or prenatal care, 
therefore decreasing the difference in the standard for 
childbirth and pregnancy).
90 See Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2005) 
(requiring all pregnant employees be treated the same as 
similarly disabled employees for all “employee-related purposes 
. . . ”). 
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The FMLA has also fallen short of its goals of meeting the 
needs of working mothers and contributes to the gaps in coverage 
by providing inadequate amounts of leave time. 91  While it has 
added greatly to the rights of pregnant employees by providing 
leave where before none was available, by not acknowledging that 
pregnancy sometimes requires enhanced leave, the FMLA increases 
the likelihood of gaps in coverage.  Beyond the general 
eligibility requirements that exclude a large number of 
employees, the twelve weeks provided for both pregnancy-related 
illness and childbirth under the FMLA falls far short of meeting 
the realistic needs of most pregnant women, in particular women 
like Gerety experiencing complications from a high-risk 
pregnancy that can require extensive leave.92  Since there is 
only one bank of twelve weeks from which an employee can draw 
both pregnancy and childbirth leave, there is a high likelihood 
a pregnant employee will quickly exhaust her FMLA leave far 
91 See Am. Pregnancy Ass’n, supra note 6 (stating that women can 
require anywhere from six weeks to several months of leave 
because of pregnancy-related illness, childbirth, or bonding 
time).
92 See Multiple Pregnancies, supra note 77 (stating that because 
of the multitude of risks involved in multiple births, large 
amounts of leave are often required).
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before the birth of her child.93
2. By Separating Pregnancy into Distinct Categories 
of Absences, State Legislatures Have Created 
Discriminatory Gaps Between Medical Leave and 
Parental Leave Which Creates a Disparate Impact 
on Pregnant Employees in Violation of the PDA
Eighteen states and the District of Columbia have enacted 
legislation that provides medical and/or parental leave above 
and beyond that offered under the FMLA.94  Notwithstanding the 
differences between states, most state legislatures have 
followed the scheme of the FMLA and have separated pregnancy 
into distinct categories of absences.95  In addition, several 
states, like New Jersey, have restricted the leave to one 
93 See, e.g., Gerety v. Atlantic City Hilton Casino Report, 877 
A.2d 1233, 1234 (N.J. 2005) (stating that Gerety exhausted all 
twelve weeks of FMLA leave while still in the second trimester 
of her pregnancy).
94 See GRANT ET AL., supra note 4, at 17 (listing California, 
Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, 
Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, and 
Washington as providing expanded leave).
95 See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 216.6 (2004) (using the same language of 
the FMLA, “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions 
. . . ,” to describe the distinct categories).
36
category of absence, and in so doing, create a potential gap 
between medical and parental leave, as illustrated in Gerety.96
Since pregnant employees face a gap in leave not faced by non-
pregnant employees taking temporary disability leave, this 
creates a disparate impact on pregnant employees, which is 
violative of the PDA.97
State legislatures provide additional, but restricted, 
leave for pregnant employees in several ways.98  First, the 
majority of states with enhanced leave legislation provide an 
additional bank of time accessible for either medical leave or
96 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:341 (2005) (limiting leave 
only to medical conditions associated with pregnancy and 
childbirth and excluding parental leave). 
97 See Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2005) 
(prohibiting dissimilar treatment between pregnant employees and 
non-pregnant employees, particularly when it comes to the 
benefits of employment).
98 See GRANT ET AL., supra note 4, at 6 (describing the ways in 
which legislators provide leave including: parental leave, 
medical leave, paid leave, sick leave flexibility, and 
disability benefits).
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parental leave.99  Some states, like Iowa, Louisiana, and New 
York, restrict the use of leave only to medical conditions 
related to pregnancy.100  Because it excludes parental leave, the 
FMLA considers this state leave additional, and therefore, the 
law would cover a pregnant employee for another twelve weeks of 
parental leave under the FMLA upon the birth of her child.101
For example, if Gerety were within such a state, she would have 
99 See id. (listing Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Minnesota, New Jersey, Tennessee, and Vermont as providing 
anywhere from six to twenty-six weeks additional medical leave 
for pregnant employees).
100 See IOWA CODE § 216.6(2) (requiring employers with four or more 
employees to provide eight weeks of leave); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
23:342 (2005) (requiring employers with twenty-five or more 
employees to provide a reasonable amount of leave, not to exceed 
sixteen weeks); N.Y. WORKER’S COMP. LAW § 205 (Consol. 2005) 
(requiring employers with one or more employees to provide 
twenty-six weeks of leave).
101 Compare IOWA CODE § 216.6(2) (granting eight weeks of leave for 
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions for 
employees at businesses with four or more employees), with 29 
U.S.C. § 2612 (providing twelve weeks of leave for the birth of 
an employee’s child at a business with fifty or more employees). 
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fallen in another gap; however, she would have first exhausted 
the state leave during her pregnancy and been eligible for 
federal leave upon the birth of her twins.102  Therefore, the 
exclusion of parental leave under state law creates a gap in 
leave, which would not be faced by non-pregnant employees.  In 
this gap, any pregnant employee would be vulnerable to 
termination or loss of seniority, a disparate impact not felt by 
non-pregnant employees facing temporary disability. 103
The reverse is true in other states where the exclusion of 
medical leave under state law creates a gap, like the one in 
Gerety, between federally provided medical leave and state 
provided parental leave.104  Other states, such as Massachusetts 
and Minnesota, have legislation like the NJFLA that limits leave 
for pregnant employees to parental leave and excludes medical 
102 See 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (recognizing that both medical and 
parental leave are triggered by childbirth).
103 See id. (stating that the employer would have rehired Gerety, 
but she would have lost almost ten years of seniority). 
104 Compare 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (providing twelve weeks of medical 
leave), with MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 105D (2005) (providing 
eight weeks of leave for the birth of a child). 
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leave for pregnancy-related illness.105  Again, because of the 
separation into distinct categories of absence and the exclusion 
of one category, the FMLA would consider leave provided for 
pregnancy-related medical condition to be in addition to any 
state provided parental leave.106 Therefore, like in Gerety, the 
gap existed where the employee exhausted all of her FMLA medical 
leave on pregnancy-related illness only days before the birth of 
her twins, when she would have been eligible for state parental 
leave.107  This gap and the risk of termination that accompanies 
it have a disparate impact on pregnant employees, which is in 
direct violation of the PDA.108
105 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 105D (2005) (requiring eight 
weeks of leave for childbirth); MINN. STAT. § 181.941 (2004) 
(requiring six weeks of leave for the birth of a child).
106 See 29 U.S.C. § 2651 (2005) (prohibiting leave provided under 
the FMLA from superseding any additional leave provided under 
state law).
107 See Gerety v. Atlantic City Hilton Casino Resort, 877 A.2d 
1233, 1236 (2005) (reporting that plaintiff exhausted leave and 
was fired on April 2nd and gave birth on April 14th).
108 See Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2005) 
(prohibiting discrimination in employment between pregnant and 
non-pregnant employees).
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The first two ways states provide enhanced leave create 
gaps in the law by excluding one category of leave.109  The third 
way states provide enhanced leave is by providing one bank of 
time that is available for both medical and parental leave, 
which avoids such the gap and therefore does not violate the 
PDA.110  As previously mentioned, when state leave provides for 
both medical and parental leave as covered by the provisions of 
the FMLA, the leave is not considered additional to the FMLA and 
the state leave runs concurrent with the federal leave.111
Therefore, states can provide enhanced leave through increasing 
the amount of leave provided or by decreasing the number of 
employees required for eligibility, but by still covering both 
medical and parental leave in one bank of time they avoid gaps 
109 Compare 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (providing twelve weeks of medical 
leave), with MINN. STAT. § 181.941 (2004) (requiring six weeks of 
leave for the birth of a child).
110 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 844 (providing ten 
weeks for both medical and parental leave).
111 See 29 U.S.C. § 2651 (2005) (prohibiting federal parental and 
medical leave from superseding only state parental and medical 
leave laws that provide additional leave). 
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between state and federal leave.112  For example, both Maine and 
Vermont provide leave to more of their citizens by reducing the 
number of employees needed for eligibility; however, they avoid 
a gap between federal and state leave by expressly providing for 
both medical and parental leave so that the pregnant employee is 
not eligible for both state and federal leave.113  Even if an 
employer had enough employees to qualify for FMLA, and 
therefore, by default, the lesser requirements under state leave 
laws, any pregnant employees would not be eligible for both 
state and federal leave.114  If Gerety were to have been employed 
112 See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 472 (2005) (requiring 
employers with ten employees or more to provide leave, as 
opposed to the FMLA’s eligibility requirement of fifty or more 
employees).
113 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 844 (requiring an 
employer with fifteen or more employees to provide ten weeks of 
leave for the birth of a child or a serious health condition);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 472 (requiring employers with ten 
employees or more to provide twelve weeks of leave for 
pregnancy-related medical conditions or to care for a newborn 
child).  
114 See 29 U.S.C. § 2651 (allowing only additional state leave 
not equivalent state leave).
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in one of these states, only one bank of twelve weeks would have 
been available to her under both state and federal leave and 
there would have been no discriminatory gap.115
The fourth way states provide enhanced leave is by going 
far beyond the FMLA in meeting the needs of pregnant employees
by providing additional banks of time for both medical and 
parental leave, instead of the one bank of time accessible for 
both.116  As previously mentioned, if both state and federal 
legislation cover a pregnant employee for both parental and 
medical leave, she is not eligible for twice the leave.117
Therefore, in these states, there is no potential gap between 
115 Compare ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 26, § 844 (covering pregnancy, 
birth, and the care of an infant), with 29 U.S.C. § 2612 
(covering pregnancy, birth, and the care of an infant).
116 See GRANT ET AL., supra note 4, at 17 (giving California an A-
for providing additional leave time for both pregnancy-related 
medical leave and parental leave to care for a newborn, with 
Hawaii, the District of Columbia, and Oregon following closely 
behind with B+’s because they do not provide paid leave as does 
California).
117 See 29 U.S.C. § 2651 (prohibiting federal parental and 
medical leave from superseding any state parental and medical 
leave laws). 
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federal and state leave.  However, because these states still 
set finite time limits on medical leave, there is a potential 
gap between the state provided medical and parental leave.118
For example, in Gerety’s case, the large amount of absence 
required as a result of her high-risk pregnancy makes it very 
likely she would have exhausted even the most generous state 
provided medical leave and faced a gap before the beginning of 
further parental leave provided by the state. 
Many work and family groups recognize California as a 
leader in providing enhanced medical and parental leave to its 
citizens.119  However, despite its generous leave provisions, 
Gerety would still face a potential gap between the state’s 
medical leave and parental leave for pregnant employees.  As 
discussed previously with regards to Guerra, California’s Fair 
Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) requires all private 
employers with five or more employees to provide up to four 
months of unpaid job-protected leave for pregnancy-related 
118 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 51.659 (2005) (providing twelve 
weeks of pregnancy-related medical leave and twelve weeks of 
parental leave upon the birth of a child). 
119 See GRANT ET AL., supra note 4, at 20-21 (commending California 
as an innovator in parental leave because of the combination of 
unpaid leave and paid leave).
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medical conditions.120  Since the coverage focuses on the 
physiological aspect of pregnancy, it covers childbirth.121
The leave provided under the FEHA is in addition to any 
leave the pregnant employee takes under the second bank of leave 
provided by California in the Family Rights Act (“FRA”).122 An 
employee is eligible for an additional twelve weeks upon the 
birth of the child under the FRA.123 The FRA shares almost all 
of its provisions and much of its legislative history with the 
120 See Fair Employment and Housing Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12945 
(b) (2) (West 2005) (requiring employers to provide leave 
regardless of the amount of time the woman has worked for the 
employer and the number of hours she has worked).
121 See id. at § 12945 (a) (waiving a length of service 
requirement and allowing the employee to use any accrued sick 
leave or vacation time, but still requiring notice to the 
employer).
122 See Liu v. Amway Corp. 347 F.3d 1125, 1132 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(finding that a pregnant employee was entitled to unpaid leave 
under FMLA after her FEHA pregnancy disability leave expired).
123 See California Family Rights Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 
12945.2(c)(3)(A) (2005) (allocating twelve weeks of parental 
leave similar to the provisions of the FMLA, except for the 
exclusion of medical leave).
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FMLA.124  However, with regards to pregnant employees, they 
differ in one important way – the provision of the FRA that 
allows leave for serious medical conditions excludes any 
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.125  Under 
the FRA, an employee, such as Gerety, would be eligible for 
coverage upon the birth of her child, despite the fact that the 
coverage excludes actual childbirth.126
However, despite these two generous allotments of leave 
under both the FEHA and the FRA, Gerety would have exhausted her 
pregnancy-related illness leave two months before the birth of 
her twins, a larger gap then she faced under Hilton’s policy. 127
124 See GRANT ET AL., supra note 4, at 7 (noting the legislative 
findings of both laws explore the changing workforce and the 
challenges of such changes).
125 See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12945.2(a),(b) (allowing leave for the 
“birth of an employee’s child” however excluding pregnancy-
related disabilities including childbirth).
126 See id. (requiring fifty or more employees for an employee to 
be eligible for leave, greatly reducing the number of citizens 
with access to such leave).
127 See id. at 1234 (reporting that Gerety was on leave for 
twenty-six weeks, which would have been beyond the twenty-four 
covered under California law).
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However, by extending a maximum of four months of medical leave, 
California does extend leave to employees whose employer’s 
policy would not be as generous as Hilton’s.128  Of course, the 
most extreme of high-risk pregnancies like Gerety’s would still 
run out of leave.129  As a result of this gap and the 
accompanying risk of termination, any pregnant employee would 
face a disparate impact not faced by non-pregnant employees, 
which is a violation of the PDA. 
4. A Reasonable Accommodation Standard Prevents a 
Discriminatory Gap in Leave Coverage
Three states function under the standard of leave called 
for by the dissent in Gerety.130  Connecticut, Hawaii, and 
128 See Gerety v. Atlantic City Hilton Casino Resort, 877 A.2d 
1233, 1243 (N.J. 2005) (Portiz, C.J. dissenting) (acknowledging 
that Hilton’s policy of providing an additional fourteen weeks 
of leave above and beyond what was required by law was very 
generous, but that it still did not change the fact that the 
impact of the policy was discriminatory).
129 See Multiple Pregnancies, supra note 77 (noting that women 
pregnant with twins or other multiples are more likely to need 
several months of leave prior to the birth of their children).
130 See Gerety v. Atlantic City Hilton Casino Resort, 877 A.2d 
1233, 1243 (N.J. 2005) (Poritz, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that 
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Montana require reasonable accommodation for women taking 
pregnancy-related disability leave.131  Reasonable accommodation 
for pregnancy is based on the standard of reasonable 
accommodation for disabilities under the American with 
Disabilities Act (“ADA”).132  Several courts have found that 
federal and state anti-discrimination laws only require that 
employers treat pregnant employees the same as other temporarily 
the court should require that employers institute a flexible 
leave policy in order to reasonably accommodate pregnant 
employees).
131 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60 (2005) (requiring employers with 
three or more employees to grant “a reasonable leave of absence” 
for pregnancy-related disabilities); HAW. ADMIN. RULES § 12-46-108 
(2005) (requiring all employers to grant job-protection for a 
“reasonable period of time” for disability due to pregnancy, 
childbirth, or related medical condition).
132
 See D'Andra Millsap, Reasonable Accommodation of Pregnancy in 
the Workplace: A Proposal to Amend the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 1412, 1430 (1996) (forcing employers to 
accommodate a disabled person’s need either through making 
physical changes to the workplace or changing the work 
environment or structure).
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disabled employees.133  Instead of setting a ceiling above which 
employers cannot rise, a reasonable accommodation sets a floor 
below which they cannot sink by investing pregnant employees 
with an affirmative right to be treated according to their needs 
instead of the needs of employees in very different medical 
situations.134  By creating a flexible standard for the amount of 
leave employers allow a pregnant employee to take, pregnant 
employees would no longer face finite amounts of medical leave 
that could potentially run out before childbirth and would have 
access to whatever meets their needs.135  Therefore, pregnant 
133 See EEOC v. Ackerman, Hood & McQueen, Inc., 956 F.2d 944, 949 
(10th Cir. 1992) (finding that employers were only required to 
treat pregnant employees the same as non-pregnant employees with 
temporary disabilities).
134 See id. at 1433 (examining the equal treatment standard and 
special treatment standards within the PDA and arguing that 
reasonable accommodation avoids the pitfalls of a male-centered 
norm found in the equal treatment standard and discrimination 
problems when special treatment is required).
135 See, e.g., Fair Employment and Housing Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE §
12945 (2005) (requiring employers to grant leave for pregnancy-
related illness, but strictly limiting the amount to four 
months).
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employees would not face potential gaps in coverage between 
medical and parental leave because they would be reasonably 
covered, especially in the case of high-risk birth presenting 
clear disabilities, until childbirth.  Without these gaps, state 
legislatures would prevent this form of disparate impact on 
pregnant employees and, therefore, violations of the PDA.
PDA equal treatment has always been difficult to understand 
and enforce because there is no male equivalent to pregnancy.136
Instead of trying to force pregnant employees into a standard 
and workplaces not designed with their needs in mind, a 
reasonable accommodation standard forces the employer to change 
the workplace to meet the needs of pregnant employees.137
Reasonable accommodation requires case-by-case analysis that 
would not only prevent unfair comparisons, but also prevent 
discriminatory gaps or disparate impacts, like the one present 
in Gerety, by providing leave for clearly disabling pregnancy-
136 See Millsap, supra note 132, at 1424 (criticizing the equal 
treatment standard because the inherent standard is a male-
centered standard with women struggling to “become more like 
men.”).
137 See id. at 1434 (arguing that since every employee has their 
own standard upon which to be judged there are no unnecessary 
comparisons).
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related illness up until birth.138
As a result of Gerety, a bill recently passed in the New 
Jersey Senate that expressly adds familial status to the state’s 
LAD and adopts the reasonable accommodation standard called for 
by the dissent in Gerety.139  Senate Bill 2522 expressly provides 
for “reasonable accommodations for pregnancy or pregnancy-
related conditions unless to do so would impose an undue 
hardship upon the employer.”140  By requiring a reasonable 
accommodation standard, the New Jersey Senate will prevent any 
leave gaps from forming, which will put pregnant employees on 
equal footing with non-pregnant employees as required by the 
PDA.
138 See id. at 1435 (preventing the blanket-policies that 
discriminate against women because of the perceived “special 
treatment” required by forcing the employer to deal with the 
individual accommodations needed by the employees). 
139 See S. 2522, 211th Leg., 2004-2005 Sess. (N.J. 2005) 
(including independent contractors within the definition of 
employee).
140 Id.  See Assemb. 4157, 211th Leg., 2004-2005 Sess. (N.J. 
2005) (awaiting posting by the Speaker of the House so that the 
bill can come to the floor for a vote).
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B. Gerety: Courts Have Misinterpreted Disparate Impact 
Theory As Only Requiring Equal Access to Leave and 
Have Ignored the Unique Nature of Pregnancy that 
Creates Per Se Discrimination with Disparate Impact
The court in Gerety explored whether or not plaintiffs can 
use anti-discrimination statutes to force employers to fill the 
gaps in leave faced by pregnant employees.141  The court made 
several mistakes in examining this issue, which are reflective 
of the uphill battle all plaintiffs face in using disparate 
impact theory.142
First, courts have incorrectly interpreted the PDA as only 
requiring that pregnant employees have equal access to the 
employer’s current temporary disability policy.143  Therefore, 
141 See Gerety v. Atlantic City Hilton Casino Resort, 877 A.2d  
1233, 1233 (2005) (concluding that a plaintiff is not asking for 
judicial remedy in facing discriminatory treatment, but rather 
is asking for preferential treatment).
142 See id. at 1234 (describing the company’s policy as allowing 
twelve weeks of leave under either the FMLA or New Jersey’s 
Family Leave Act, in addition to fourteen weeks provided by the 
company).
143 See EEOC v. Ackerman, Hood & McQueen, Inc., 956 F.2d 944, 949 
(10th Cir. 1992) (concluding that the PDA only required neutral 
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even when the courts allow disparate impact theory to be used, 
their analysis ends with proof of neutral application.144
However, if the PDA only required neutral application of the 
policy already in place, then it would fall far short of truly 
protecting pregnant employees and disparate impact theory would 
be completely ineffective.
For example, the court in Gerety made the same mistake by 
finding that New Jersey’s anti-discrimination statute only 
requires neutral application and equating that requirement with 
the requirement of disparate impact theory.145  However, as the 
dissent argued, the court has been granted the “broad remedial 
purpose” of eliminating all discrimination and that mere neutral 
application falls far short of achieving that goal.146  If the 
application between pregnant employees and non-pregnant, but 
similarly disabled, employees).
144 See Gerety, 877 A.2d at 1240-42 (misinterpreting the 
requirements of disparate impact and incorrectly rejecting 
pregnant women as a protected class).
145 See id. at 1240 (stating that there is no disparate impact 
because there was gender-neutral application which is “what the 
LAD requires . . . ”).
146 See id. at 1243 (disagreeing that the judiciary usurps 
legislative function in requiring enhanced leave and stating 
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PDA only required neutral application then disparate impact 
theory would be inapposite because its is to provide remedy in 
the case of discrimination even if there is neutral 
application.147  Therefore, the requirement is that the plaintiff 
proves a discriminatory impact and successfully defends any 
claims by the employer of business necessity.148  If a plaintiff 
could only succeed in circumstances where there was no facially 
neutral policy, then discriminatory impact would be completely 
unnecessary because all such claims would fall under a disparate 
treatment analysis.149
that the LAD would be ineffective without judicial 
intervention). 
147 See United Prop. Owners Ass’n of Belmar v. Borough of Belmar, 
777 A.2d 950, 978 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (finding 
disparate impact when a facially neutral policy “resulted in a 
significantly disproportionate or adverse impact members of the 
affected class . . . ”).
148 See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 
2000e-2 (2005) (requiring only discriminatory impact not 
discriminatory motive).
149 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 
(1973) (stating that an employee can establish a prima facie 
case of disparate treatment by showing that she belongs to a 
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By focusing only on application, the court never truly 
examined the impact of Hilton’s policy on Gerety and other 
pregnant employees.150  The court only mentioned that additional 
leave would have been available to Gerety after childbirth and 
ignored completely the thirteen-day gap between when the 
employer fired the plaintiff and when the state would have 
provided her with additional leave for childbirth.151  The court 
never even alluded to the fact that Mr. Gerety also had a baby 
but was not fired. 152  When courts focus only on neutral 
protected class, that she applied and was qualified for a job, 
despite that she was rejected, and that after this rejection, 
the position remained open). 
150 See Gerety, 877 A.2d at 1240 (examining no statistics with 
regards to the impact on pregnant women of the policy or even 
selective individual evidence beyond that presented by Gerety 
herself).
151 See id. at 1241 (mentioning additional leave when expounding 
on the “generosity” of  Hilton’s policy and how it far surpassed 
the requirements of the law but failing to mention the gap the 
policy created).
152 See id. at 1246 (Poritz, C.J., dissenting) (pointing out that 
Mr. Gerety was able to keep his job and that the fact that Mrs. 
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application, they ignore impacts such as these.  While not every 
pregnant employee works with her spouse, so that the court can 
clearly see a discriminatory impact, disparate impact can be 
proven by looking to the male employees with children who escape 
the birth of a child without job-related harm.  In Gerety’s 
case, it is not only that her husband did not lose his job, but 
also that the law would not force other temporarily disabled 
employees to separate their condition into distinct categories 
and face gaps in coverage between those categories. 
Second, courts continually refuse to see pregnancy as a 
medical condition unique to women and therefore, any leave 
policy affecting only pregnant women should be seen as per se 
discrimination, as stated in the PDA.153  The court in Gerety
concludes that pregnancy is a medical condition unique to women,
but that with regards to leave, pregnancy is no different than 
medical conditions affecting only men, such as testicular 
Gerety was not, is precisely what the Court stated anti-
discrimination laws were trying to prevent).
153 See Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2005) 
(stating clearly that pregnancy is unique to women and therefore 
should be included in the definition of gender discrimination).
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cancer.154
The court’s logic was erroneous for a number of reasons.  
First, as the plaintiff argues, pregnancy is very different from 
a gender-specific cancer, primarily because cancer affects both 
genders in specific ways.155  More importantly, however, the 
legislature rejected this reasoning, present since Gilbert, with 
the PDA specifically because it treats pregnancy only as a 
medical condition, instead of as a unique characteristic that 
creates groups composed entirely of women.156  Instead, the court 
stated that Gerety was requesting preferential treatment, not 
protection from discrimination, which the court concluded was 
154 See id. at 1240 (asserting that the plaintiff would require 
more leave for a pregnant woman than a woman suffering from 
ovarian cancer).
155 See Gerety, 877 A.2d at 1241 (responding to plaintiff’s 
argument that both sexes can be affected by cancer by arguing 
that pregnant women should not be afforded more leave than women 
with ovarian cancer).
156 See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 130 (1976) 
(approving the exclusion of pregnancy, “a disease or disability 
comparable in all other respects to covered diseases or 
disabilities and yet confined to the members of one . . . sex” 
from insurance coverage). 
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not required by federal or state law.157  However, the majority 
mischaracterized the issue.158  The issue was not one of 
preferential treatment, but the inadequacy of leave provided for 
pregnancy-related illness under the employer policy and the 
disparate impact of that inadequacy upon pregnant employees.159
Pregnancy is a medical condition not only unique to women, but 
unique from other medical conditions because pregnancy has a 
definitive end. Therefore, policies such as Hilton’s 
discriminate against pregnant employees using leave for 
pregnancy-related illness by not only limiting the leave 
available to medical conditions unrelated to pregnancy, but, 
157 See Gerety, 877 A.2d at 1242 (proffering that it is the 
legislator’s duty to decide if employers should be required to 
provide “enhanced leave to cover the panoply of medical needs 
that may arise during pregnancy”).  
158 See id. at 1246 (Poritz, C.J., dissenting) (arguing the 
majority completely misinterpreted the LAD and the broad 
remedial powers granted the court under the legislation).
159 See id. (Poritz, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the leave 
policy would only be preferential if both men and women could 
become pregnant and women then asked to be treated differently).
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more importantly, limiting the leave available to childbirth.160
Leave legislation would not limit a non-pregnant employee in 
such a way, especially if such limitations created a gap in 
coverage.  Therefore both the LAD and the PDA prohibit this type 
of treatment.161
Last, courts rejecting disparate impact theory claims 
ignore precedent requiring that employers comprehensively meet 
the needs of pregnant employees.162 Several cases set a clear 
160 See Gerety, 877 A.2d at 1243 (Poritz, C.J., dissenting) 
(interpreting the LAD broadly as prohibiting all discrimination 
and granting the judiciary remedial power to end such 
discrimination without usurping the legislature).  
161 See Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2005) 
(stating clearly that pregnant employees should be treated the 
same as “other persons not so affected but similar in their 
ability or inability to work” with regards to benefits and 
leave). 
162 See Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: 
Relief for Family Caregivers Who are Discriminated Against on 
the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L. J. 77, 131 (2003) (suggesting that 
plaintiffs desiring to prove a disparate impact anticipate the 
usual objections to the use of statistical evidence and perhaps 
use demographic data that shows the impact on women in general).
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precedent regarding the use of disparate impact theory in 
pregnancy discrimination cases.163  Even when, as in Gerety, the 
employers complied with the legislation in place at the time, 
other courts have still found a disparate impact on pregnant 
employees.164
163 See Scherr v. Woodland Sch. Cmty. Consol. Dist. No. 50, 867 
F.2d 974, 978 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding explicitly that PDA 
claims may be brought under a disparate impact theory); see also 
Abraham v. Graphic Arts Int’l Union, 660 F.2d 811, 813 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981) (applying disparate impact theory to pregnancy 
discrimination cases and anticipating further application as the 
PDA progressed); EEOC v. Warshawsky & Co., 768 F. Supp. 647, 654 
(N.D. Ill. 1991) (permitting the use of disparate impact theory 
with statistical evidence in a pregnancy discrimination case).
164 See Scherr, 867 F.2d at 978 (finding the school’s policy of 
disallowing a combination of leave could be challenged under 
disparate impact, even though the policy was legal under federal 
and state leave legislation); see also Abraham, 660 F.2d at 813 
(finding that the company’s policy of allowing only ten days of 
leave had a disparate impact on pregnant employees, even though 
the policy did not violate federal and state leave legislation); 
Warshawsky, 768 F. Supp. at 654 (finding that the employer’s 
policy of firing first-year employees who required long-term 
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Of course, employer’s policies are very diverse and the 
response differs from court to court.165  However, as the Gerety 
dissent argues, the presence of a leave gap is reflective of a 
bigger issue of insufficient leave.166  In Abraham v. Graphic 
Arts Int’l Union, the court clearly stated that “[a]n employer 
can incur a Title VII violation as much by lack of an adequate 
leave policy as by unequal application of a policy it does 
sick leave had a discriminatory impact, even though the policy 
did not violate federal and state leave legislation).
165See Wendy W. Williams, Equality’s Riddle: Pregnancy and the 
Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 325, 365 (1984-5) (suggesting that the reason for the 
lack of precedent applying disparate impact theory to pregnancy 
discrimination cases is because in earlier years overt 
discrimination predominated, necessitating the application of 
disparate treatment theory and only later in the 1970’s did it 
become apparent that neutral rules could also be 
discriminatory).
166 See Gerety v. Atlantic City Hilton Casino Resort, 866 A.2d 
1233, 1243 (N.J. 2005) (Poritz, C.J., dissenting) (arguing this 
lack of sufficient leave has a clear impact on pregnant 
employees).
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have.”167  Unfortunately, the majority in Gerety mirrored other 
courts’ views that employer policies that comply with more 
generous federal and state leave policies are not 
discriminatory.168  One can assume a pregnant employee would be 
rejected if filing suit against an employer policy that was in 
legal compliance with a state law, such as California’s, which 
offers several months of leave. However, such a preference by 
the court would be erroneous because the generosity of the 
legislation alone does not change the fact that legislation can 
create a gap, which has a disparate impact upon only pregnant 
employees.  
A plaintiff has several strategies available to her whether 
167 See Abraham, 660 F.2d at 819 (finding that despite the fact 
that pregnant employees had access to the same ten-day leave 
policy as male employees, it was “beyond peradventure” that the 
leave policy was too short for adequate pregnancy or childbirth 
leave).
168 See Gerety, 877 A.2d at 1234 (emphasizing that the employer 
already provided an amount of leave “more than the twice as much 
as required by law”); see also Davidson v. Franciscan Health 
Sys. of the Ohio Valley, Inc., 82 F.2d 768, 772 (2000) (finding 
that a hospital’s policy of fourteen weeks of leave in addition 
to the twelve weeks provided by FMLA did not violate the PDA).
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she is pleading in a no-leave state or a generous leave state, 
such as California.169  In order to make a case for disparate 
impact, pregnant employees can employ social statistics to give 
judicial notice of general discrimination, instead of being 
forced to rely only on instances of impact at that specific 
employer.170  This type of proof is particularly important in the 
case of leave gaps because they disproportionately affect high-
risk pregnancies and an employee might have a difficult time 
showing multiple instances of affected high-risk pregnancies at 
one employer, since they are relatively rare.171  However, 
169 See Williams, supra note 162, at 134 (arguing that plaintiffs 
should use new demographic data on motherhood to establish “how 
objective work requirements, like mandatory overtime, have a 
disparate impact on women and mothers in the workforce . . . ”).
170 See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977) (stating: 
“There is no requirement, however, that a statistical showing of 
disproportionate impact must always be based on analysis of the 
characteristics of actual applicants.”).
171 See Gerety, 877 A.2d at 1234 (stating that the employee 
suffered bona fide medical conditions due to being pregnant with 
twins); see also Davidson, 82 F.2d at 768 (stating that the 
employee suffered from bona fide medical conditions due to being 
pregnant with triplets).
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employers can always defend themselves with claims of business 
necessity, especially in the face of extensive leave 
requirements.172  In response, several legal scholars argue that 
to combat this defense, employees should rely on increasing 
evidence of employers adopting generous leave policies and the 
positive business impact of such policies.173  This type of 
evidence not only combats the business necessity defense but 
also goes to establishing a less discriminatory alternative.174
C. Implications and Recommendations
1. Leave Benefits Not Only the Employee and Employer 
but Society in General and Should Be Legally 
Mandated
172 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) 
(resolving that a discriminatory employer policy cannot be 
sustained unless it can be shown to relate to job performance). 
173 See Williams, supra note 162, at 134 (arguing that plaintiffs 
should also use recent demographic data that demonstrates 
objective work requirements discriminatorily effect women). For 
instance, policies that require mandatory overtime or offer 
reduced benefits to part-time employees have a disparate impact 
on women, particularly women with children.  Id.
174 See id. (establishing that family friendly policies are not 
only less discriminatory but also improve productively and 
reduce rates of absenteeism, turnover, recruitment).  
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Women do not experience pregnancy in clearly definable 
categories.  Pregnancy is seen as a holistic experience covering 
all aspects of a person’s life, including physical, 
psychological, economical, and emotional, and the law should 
treat it as such.  Our country simply does not provide the 
comprehensive leave pregnant employees need to meet their own 
and their growing family’s needs, despite increasing evidence 
that expanded leave would be best for both the employer and 
employee.175
As previously stated, comprehensive leave for pregnant 
employees can prevent the formation of other medical
conditions.176  In addition, adequate leave can result in better 
prenatal and postnatal care, which is good not only for the 
175 See GRANT ET AL., supra note 4, at 7 (noting that despite 
political rhetoric, the U.S. is ranked virtually last among 
industrialized nation with regards to parental leave).
176 See Shellenbarger, supra note 19 (reporting that fifty to 
seventy percent of women experience post-partum anxiety, which 
can be exacerbated by the stress of returning to work too soon).
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mother and child, but society in general.177  More importantly, 
adequate leave upon the birth of the child can result in a bevy 
of benefits for the parents and child including: improved brain 
development, social development, and overall well-being of the 
baby.178  Adequate leave policies also have positive results for 
society by increasing the likelihood that children will be 
immunized and, as a result, are decreasing childhood mortality 
rates.179
Comprehensive leave not only benefits employees, and 
therefore, society in general, but also results in benefits to 
177 See GRANT ET AL., supra note 4, at 7 (arguing that parents are 
already attuned to the benefits of leave and want better 
legislation).
178 See id. (arguing far too many parents are robbed of these 
benefits by citing a survey that found four out of five parents 
with children believe that many new mothers are pressured to 
return to work too quickly).
179 See id. (arguing that better parental leave policies would 
help other societal problems, such as the lack of quality child 
care).
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employers.180 Several studies have shown that access to leave is 
directly tied to employee retention and increased 
productivity.181  While the FMLA does not provide enough leave to 
meet the needs of working parents, that small increase alone has 
already had a positive impact on profitability and growth of 
leave.182
2. Recommendations
The number of working women reporting instances of 
pregnancy discrimination continues to rise, even as the birth 
rate declines.183  As a result, pregnant women are taking less 
180 See id. at 11 (stating that an increase in the leave 
available to employees, be it paid or unpaid, is beneficial to 
employers).
181 See Katherine Ross Phillips, Getting Time Off:  Access to 
Leave Among Working Parents (The Urban Institute 2004) (showing 
also that morale improves and employees show more loyalty toward 
the company).
182 See id. (stating that in 2000, ninety percent of covered 
establishments reported that the FMLA had either a positive or 
neutral effect on profitability and growth).
183 See Rob Schumaucher, Pregnant Workers Report Growing 
Discrimination, USATODAY.COM, Feb. 16, 2005, http://www.usatoday
.com/money/workplace/2005-02-16-pregnancy-bias-usat_x.htm?
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time off and working even up until their last month of 
pregnancy.184  This is an important issue that states need to 
address and the first step is adopting reasonable accommodation 
standards for medical and parental leave.185  In doing so, states 
would treat pregnancy comprehensively instead of drawing 
confusing lines that create potential gaps in coverage.  
The federal government should include a reasonable 
accommodation standard within the PDA that applies to all 
POE=click-refer (reporting that pregnancy discrimination 
complaints to the EEOC jumped thirty-nine percent between 1999 
and 2003, even though the birth rate dropped nine percent).
184 See Sharon Jayson, New Moms Taking Less Time Off With Babies, 
USATODAY.COM, Nov. 13, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/
2005-11-13-mombabytime_x.htm?POE=click-refer (reporting that 
about fifty-seven percent of new moms worked full time while 
pregnant in 1996-2000 as opposed to about forty percent in 1961-
65). In addition, over half of pregnant employees worked into 
the last month of pregnancy.  Id.
185 See Millsap, supra note 132, at 1450 (arguing that the 
federal government should also adopt a reasonable accommodations 
standard under the PDA).
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pregnancy-related conditions, including childbirth.186  The 
physiological needs of pregnant women have a definitive end, and 
therefore, could be safely dealt with under the reasonable 
accommodation standard.  However, the federal government should 
adopt a completely separate system of parental leave that begins 
several weeks after childbirth and could have finite amounts of 
coverage, since bonding time is an amorphous concept, but still 
essential to American families.187
IV. CONCLUSION
The separation of pregnancy into the three distinct periods 
of absence due to illness related to gestation, childbirth, and 
parental creates potential gaps in coverage that can leave 
pregnant employees without leave and without job protection.188
186 See id. (arguing that the adoption of a reasonable 
accommodation standard within the PDA would prevent inconsistent 
results among states and employers).
187 See, e.g., California Family Rights Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 
12945.2(c)(3)(A) (2005) (providing twelve weeks of leave for the 
birth of a child or for a serious medical conditions, excluding 
pregnancy-related conditions). 
188 See, e.g., Gerety v. Atlantic City Hilton Casino Resort, 877 
A.2d 1233, 1236 (N.J. 2005) (stating that the plaintiff was 
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While legislators have gone a long way in responding to the 
needs of pregnant employees, their piecemeal efforts have 
resulted in gaps between medical and parental leave provided at 
both the state and federal level. Only a reasonable 
accommodation standard can solve this problem by refusing to set 
strict leave limits on pregnant employees and thus adequately 
providing for their needs.189  However, where such legislation is 
not available, employees who are faced with such a gap in 
coverage should still be able to go to the court under disparate 
impact theory and ask for remedy.190
fired during thirteen day gap in coverage between federally 
provided medical leave and state provided parental leave).
189 See Gerety, 877 A.2d at 1243 (Poritz, C.J., dissenting) 
(arguing that plaintiff should be reasonably accommodated during 
her pregnancy and that this is not preferential treatment, 
because of the unique reproductive position of women).
190 See Williams, supra note 162, at 134 (arguing that disparate 
impact theory is a viable and successful option for 
discrimination litigation, if pursued in the correct manner).
